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WHEN FEAR RULES IN LAW'S PLACE: PSEUDONYMOUS
LITIGATION AS A RESPONSE TO SYSTEMATIC INTIMIDATION
Benjamin P. Edwards*
ABSTRACT
When reprisals and intimidation make certain types of cases too
risky for most plaintifs to file, courts should preserve access to justice
by allowing more plaintifs to proceed pseudonymously. As it stands,
courts may be deciding requests to proceed under a pseudonym without
understanding the full scope of possible retaliation risks, including that
past retaliation may work continuing harm through the stress created by
fear
Unusually heightened retaliation risks may be best exemplified by
the nasty reprisals befalling plaintifs in separation of church and state
cases. Although multiple books addressed the issue in the mid-90s, the
violent trend has continued since that time. This Article traces that trend
further into the current day to provide a more accurate assessment of
systemic risks. A timely understanding of the current environment is
essential because courts have begun to express skepticism about whether
the risk remains or whether a few dated, anecdotal accounts actually
constitute a trend. As courts and practitioners seek guidance about
requests for pseudonymity today, there is urgent need for information
and guidance on this issue. This Article s guidance reaches beyond the
separation of church and state context to argue that courts should alter
their analysis when faced with any set of cases generating similar trends.
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1. INTRODUCTION
On socially-charged issues, a history of backlash and intimidation
against plaintiffs may convince potential plaintiffs that court proceedings
are too dangerous to pursue. For example, plaintiffs bringing separation
of church and state cases regularly receive nasty, vitriolic threats.
Because describing these threats as disturbing fails to convey the
emotions they induce, I spotlight three examples below:
Letter received by a plaintiff You would look so
cute without an eye to offend you and without a tongue
to offend me and mine . . . We will make some lovely
incisions in your filthy bellies and pull out those nervy
Guts one by one, slow and easy.'
Twitter post directed at a plaintiff your home
address posted online i cant wait to hear about you
getting curb stomped 2 you fucking worthless cunt.3
Note received by a plaintiff You're Next!
(accompanied by parrot's severed head).'
'This is from a threatening letter received by Vashti McCollum after she
challenged sectarian religious instruction in her child's public school. VASHTI
MCCOLLUM, ONE WOMAN'S FIGHT 98 (rev. ed. 1961).
2 "Curb stomp" refers to a brutal act where a person "stomps on the back of [the
victim's] head while [she] is forced to bite a street curb." Monschke v. Cross,
No. 11-5276 RBL/KLS, 2012 WL 2565026, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 11, 2012)
(explaining "curb stomp").
3 Ophelia Benson, Who's Oppressing Whom, COUNCIL FOR SECULAR
HUMANISM, http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=fi&
page=benson 32_4 (last visited Aug. 30, 2012) (errors in original).
4 Christina Lee Knauss, A Quiet Life No More, THE STATE, Sept. 19, 2004, at
DI.
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Alongside countless threats and attacks like these, named plaintiffs
have had their houses firebombed and burned to the ground, their
children assaulted, and more.' Sadly, a plaintiff who considers bringing a
case to enforce separation of church and state6 protections should expect
similar threats. Compounding the issue, modem technology has made it
easier for non-parties to disseminate litigants' contact information and to
encourage others to harass plaintiffs.'
To avoid this abuse, some plaintiffs seek judicial permission to
proceed under a pseudonym. Courts must make difficult decisions about
when to allow plaintiffs to adopt a pseudonym. If they set too high a bar
for finding protectable interests, courts will effectively turn their backs
on cases they would otherwise be hearing by allowing intimidation and
fear of reprisal to force plaintiffs out of court. Even when pseudonyms
are allowed, defendants and non-parties may attempt to "out" the
plaintiff. Justice Stevens spotlighted this problem in Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe. The Justice explained that although
the district court had allowed the plaintiffs to "litigate anonymously to
protect them from intimidation or harassment," the school district
"'apparently neither agreed with nor particularly respected"' the district
court's decision to protect the plaintiffs' identities.8 Attempts by
defendants to ferret out the plaintiffs' identities led the district court to
order that all efforts to expose the plaintiffs' identities cease because the
court wanted the issues "'addressed on their merits, and not on the basis
of intimidation or harassment of the participants on either side."'" Thus,
intimidation and harassment could still deter plaintiffs from filing and
thereby impede the rule of law if pseudonyms are infrequently allowed
or loosely enforced.
In this Article, I examine how courts assess whether a plaintiff faces
a risk of injury or retaliation. I also examine how courts should treat
cases where plaintiffs will likely face unsettling risks merely because of
the nature of the action. I argue that history should serve as a guide to
determine the risks future plaintiffs may face, including the likelihood
that plaintiffs will genuinely and reasonably fear for their safety. The
5 See FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION: THE CIVIL
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AND DISSENTERS 13-16 (1999) (describing
harassment suffered by plaintiffs).
6 For ease of use, this Article refers to cases involving separation of church and
state issues as "church-state" cases.
I See, e.g., David Carr, A Shooting, and Instant Polarization, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2012, at BI ("On Twitter, the movie director Spike Lee passed on what he
thought was Mr. [George] Zimmerman's address, but it was wrong and an
elderly couple was forced to flee from their home.").
8 530 U.S. 290, 294 n.1 (2000) (quoting Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168
F.3d 806, 809 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999)).
9 Id. (quoting from district court order).
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dangers in church-state cases, specifically, illustrate a possible systemic
risk for otherwise well-functioning democracies: on certain issues, fear
may rule in law's place if people are too afraid to ask, much less litigate
to ensure, that the law be enforced.'o To preserve constitutional rights
and access to justice, legal systems must provide well-functioning
mechanisms to check against intimidation-especially when fear
generated by past reprisals may be keeping people out of court."
Many authors have touched on the need to rethink current standards
for pseudonymous plaintiffs. For example, Professor Jayne S. Ressler
grappled with the issue in light of the need to rethink how we apply
ancient common law norms in the age of the internet. 2 Jed Greer, on the
other hand, examined whether plaintiffs should proceed under
pseudonyms in civil litigation addressing childhood sexual abuse or
claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act." Still other scholars have sought
to build intellectual frameworks for pseudonymous litigation or to allow
defendants the right to proceed under a pseudonym. 4 This Article joins
the discussion and addresses how courts should consider requests for
pseudonymity when plaintiffs risk pariah status, intimidation, and
reprisals for bringing unpopular court actions. To make the argument, I
focus on church-state actions as the paradigmatic case type where the
current, narrow analysis may miss the impact of past reprisals on
plaintiff's decisions to file.' 5
1o This danger has been discussed by numerous scholars. See RAVITCH, supra
note 5, at 206 (noting that many cases "will never be heard for fear of
backlash"); Nadine Strossen, How Much God in the Public Schools, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 607, 610, 615-16 (1995) ("[G]iven that many victims of this
kind of religious freedom violation are understandably reluctant to challenge
such violations-in light of the harassment and worse they would face-the
cases that come to our attention, numerous as they are, still represent only the
tip of the iceberg.").
" See discussion infra Section IV.
12 See Jayne S. Ressler, Privacy, Plaintifs, and Pseudonyms: The Anonymous
Doe Plaintiff in the Information Age, 53 KAN. L. REv. 195 (2004).
13 See Jed Greer, Plaintiff Pseudonymity and the Alien Tort Claims Act:
Questions and Challenges, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 517 (2001); Amit
Shertzer, Note, PlaintiffAnonymity During Civil Litigation of Childhood Sexual
Abuse Cases, 33 CARDOZO L. REv. 2199, 2204-06 (2012).
14 See Adam A. Milani, Doe v. Roe: An Argument for Defendant Anonymity
When a Pseudonymous Plaintiff Alleges a Stigmatizing Intentional Tort, 41
WAYNE L. REv. 1659 (1995); Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous
Parties: When Should Litigants Be Permitted to Keep Their Identities
Confidential, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1985); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous
Litigation, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 1239 (2010).
'1 Similar risks for plaintiffs may exist to greater or lesser degrees in cases
involving abortion, sexual orientation, gender expression, challenges to union
governance and possibly also in cases challenging affirmative action practices.
440 [Vol. 20:3
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To ground this argument, Section II presents the standards and
policies federal courts consider when adjudicating requests to adopt a
pseudonym and overviews the commonly applied "factor balancing
test."'" Section III goes into greater detail about how courts analyze
whether a plaintiff faces a risk of injury or retaliation because of filing.
Section IV discusses, documents, and categorizes the reprisals plaintiffs
have suffered in past church-state cases. Section V makes the case for
changing the analytic structure courts apply when considering
pseudonymous litigation to account for histories of violence and
intimidation in similar cases.
II. FEDERAL CASE LAW GOVERNING PSEUDONYMOUS LITIGATION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address requests to
proceed under a pseudonym. Accordingly, the procedural methods for
raising the issue vary by circuit." The Fourth Circuit and the D.C.
Circuit suggest that plaintiffs approach the court ex parte to secure
permission to file a complaint under a pseudonym." The Tenth Circuit
has ruled that district courts lack jurisdiction over the parties if the
parties fail to secure explicit permission before proceeding
pseudonymously." The Fifth Circuit allows plaintiffs to proceed under a
pseudonym provided they promptly move for a protective order at the
onset of litigation.20
While the procedural mechanisms remain unsettled, circuit courts
have coalesced around the same analytic framework for requests to
proceed under a pseudonym. The current balancing test weighs the
plaintiff's privacy interest against the public interest in knowing the
plaintiff's name and against any unfairness to the defendant. This test
gradually emerged over the latter part of the twentieth century as more
courts considered how to address requests to adopt a pseudonym. The
Fifth Circuit reached the issue with its seminal decision in Southern
Methodist University Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, a
16 Although state courts might also benefit from reexamining their practices, this
Article focuses on the federal standards because the vast majority of church-
state litigation flows through the federal courts.
" Donald P. Balla, John Doe Is Alive and Well: Designing Pseudonym Use in
American Courts, 63 ARK. L. REV. 691, 706 (2010).
1 James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 1993); Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228
F.R.D. 8, 10 (D.D.C. 2005).
19 W.N.J. v. Yocom, 257 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2001). The harsh result in
WN.I may be partially explained by the indelicate nature of the suit. The
plaintiffs sought to challenge laws against fornication and sodomy and the court
of appeals may have wanted to dispose of the appeal without reaching the
issues. Id.
20See Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 181-82 (5th Cir. 1981).
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sex discrimination case. 2' The decision identified factors where
pseudonymity had been allowed in the past, yet when applying those
factors, the court declined to protect the sex-discrimination plaintiffs.22
Two years later, the Fifth Circuit returned to the issue in Doe v. Stegall
and clarified that the analysis required courts to balance the public's
right to know with a plaintiff's privacy interest. 23 Notably, Stegall
protected the identities of plaintiffs bringing a challenge to the practice
of Bible reading in Mississippi public schools and did so because of
safety concerns.2 4 Since the Fifth Circuits' decisions, the test has
broadened to encompass fairness to the defendant as well.25
Now, for any type of pseudonymity, courts generally balance three
interests to determine whether a plaintiff may adopt a pseudonym: (i) the
public's interest in knowing the plaintiff's identity; (ii) fairness to
defendants; and (iii) the plaintiff's need for privacy protection. 26 Each of
these policy interests encompasses a variety of concerns, and circuit
courts that review lower courts' decisions regarding these interests, do so
only under an abuse of discretion standard.2 7
21 599 F.2d 707, 712 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Plaintiffs have not cited, nor have we
found, any prior decisions which recognize or even discuss the right of Title VII
plaihtiffs to proceed anonymously.").22 Id. at 712-13.
23 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The decision requires a balancing of
considerations calling for maintenance of a party's privacy against the
customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial
proceedings.").
24 Id.
25 See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993).
26 The Second Circuit recently articulated the test as balancing the "plaintiff's
interest in anonymity . . . against both the public interest in disclosure and any
prejudice to the defendant." Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d
185, 189 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp.,
214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); S. Methodist Univ. Ass'n of
Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 714 (5th Cir. 1979)
("[T]his ruling strikes a sensible balance between [the defendant's] need to
defend this lawsuit and the [plaintiff association's] desire to avoid the
purportedly adverse consequences of revealing" its members' identities); Doe v.
Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 545, 549 (D.N.J. 2006) (courts
must balance "the strong interest in ensuring public access to judicial
proceedings ... against the private interests favoring anonymity").
27 See Sealed Plaintiff 537 F.3d at 190 ("[OJur review of a district court's
decision to grant or deny an application to litigate under a pseudonym is for
abuse of discretion.").
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A. THE THREE INTERESTS
1. The Public's Interest in Knowing the Plaintiff s Identity
The public's interest in knowing the plaintiff's identity derives from
the public's interest in open court proceedings, generally.28 The United
States Supreme Court traced the history of open proceedings to
Blackstone and Hale, early English jurists, who argued in favor of "the
importance of openness to the proper functioning of a trial...."29 With
this history before it, the Court interpreted the Constitution as "enacted
against the backdrop of the long history of trials being presumptively
open."30
Nevertheless, pseudonymous proceedings do not significantly
diminish the public's right of access, because court proceedings remain
open and the press retains its freedom to report on courtroom happenings
and decisions."1 Supporters of open courts point to historical,
constitutional, and policy grounds justifying the requirement that public
business be conducted publicly and argue that some of these
justifications apply to pseudonymous plaintiffs.32 But because the use of
a pseudonym does not actually "close" a court, reporters may still access
decisions and report on hearings and courtroom happenings even when
the plaintiff's identity is obscured. Thus, despite the "history of trials
being presumptively open," courts should carefully consider the public's
specific interest in knowing the plaintiff's identity instead of
automatically assuming that pseudonymous proceedings should be
avoided because of the long history of open courts.
Many circuit and district courts also characterize Rule 10(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as protecting the public's interest in
open trials because it requires plaintiffs to "name all the parties."33
28 See Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th
Cir. 1997) ("Identifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension
of publicness. The people have a right to know who is using their courts.");
United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that open
courts provide "a measure of accountability" and allow "the public to have
confidence in the administration of justice").
29 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).301d. at 575; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979)
(recognizing that "both civil and criminal trials have traditionally been open to
the public"). Moreover, the Sixth Amendment explicitly provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial[.]" U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
31 See Steinman, supra note 14, at 18.
32 See Ressler, supra note 12, at 195.
33 See Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that Rule
10(a) "has constitutional overtones" related to the public interest in open
proceedings).
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Emphasizing the importance of Rule 10(a), other courts have found that
it exists for more than "administrative convenience" and that it "protects
the public's legitimate interest in knowing all the facts and events
surrounding court proceedings." 34
These decisions, however, may overstate Rule 1 O(a)'s importance for
pseudonymous plaintiffs. Professor Carol M. Rice disputes whether Rule
10(a) has any direct connection to the policy goals advanced by open
judicial proceedings. She argues that Rule 10(a)'s pleading requirements
are not designed to preserve open courts or to bar pseudonymous
pleading, and contends that "Rule 10(a) simply seeks to distinguish the
more formal caption in the complaint from all others, which for economy
need not list every party" and that "Rule 10(a) does not necessarily
dictate the substance of the name designation."35
Despite the weaknesses of relying on Rule 10(a) or the longstanding
history of open trials, other policies do justify the public's interest in
knowing the plaintiff's name. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
the Supreme Court praised open trials for giving the public "assurance
that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned," as well as
discouraging perjury, misconduct, and "decisions based on secret bias or
partiality."3 6 When a plaintiff adopts a pseudonym, though, there is
always a risk that the judge may have a personal connection with that
plaintiff. But because the plaintiff's identity is unknown, the public is
left with few, if any, ways to uncover the judge's bias. For this reason,
academics also agree that open judicial proceedings deter corruption and
enhance public confidence in the courts." Professor Steinman noted that
public observance of the judicial process protects the court against
unfounded accusations that it has abused its power." This in turn may
improve compliance with court orders and allow for community
catharsis by replacing self help with dispute resolution through the
judicial process.3 9
Still, a policy of complete openness carries significant
disadvantages. As Professor Ressler points out, "a judicial system that
often appears to value openness at any price" may force special burdens
on plaintiffs who lose their privacy.40 In many instances, such as with
minor plaintiffs or plaintiffs facing potentially severe retaliation, privacy
interests may outweigh the benefits accruing from complete openness.
3 See Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158, 160 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to
Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. Pi'rr. L. REV. 883, 911 (1996).
36 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).
3 See Ressler, supra note 12; Shertzer, supra note 13, at 2204-06.
38 Steinman, supra note 14, at 16-17.
3 Id.
40 See Ressler, supra note 12, at 195.
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Even more, many of the rationales for open proceedings may be only
partially implicated by pseudonymous plaintiffs. Ressler argues that only
in a "rare case" will the public not be able to "realize the full benefits of
an open trial without knowing the plaintiff's name" because the pertinent
characteristics of the plaintiff's identity may still be made available. 4 1
Her arguments echo those of the Fifth Circuit, which also found that the
"public right to scrutinize governmental functioning is not so completely
impaired by a grant of anonymity to a party as it [would be] by [the]
closure of the trial itself."42 Along the same lines, the Fourth Circuit has
recognized that pseudonymous witnesses do not make trials unfair
because juries may make standard credibility determinations by
observing witnesses' demeanor without knowing their true names. 4 3
Indeed, pseudonymous proceedings may actually make trials fairer by
making it far less likely for jurors to search the Internet to discover, and
become influenced by, information not presented at trial.4 4
Still, pseudonymous litigation does present some tension with the
public's right of access to judicial proceedings because the public cannot
assess whether material conflicts of interest exist without also knowing
the plaintiff's identity.45
2. Relevant Privacy Interests
In addition to considering the public's interest in knowing the
plaintiff's name, courts weigh the plaintiff's interest in maintaining
privacy. The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized this interest by
hearing cases with pseudonymous plaintiffs.4 6 For instance, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly decided landmark cases involving pseudonymous
41 Id. at 218.
42 Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981).
43 James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1993). James involved plaintiffs
seeking to proceed under a pseudonym to protect their children from being
haunted by publicity from troubling revelations about their paternity. The
plaintiffs had discovered that the doctor hired to artificially inseminate one of
the plaintiffs with the other plaintiff's sperm had actually used his own sperm
instead. Id. at 235.
" Because jurors may easily conduct independent research through online
search engines, some courts have struggled to ensure that juries only consider
information on the record. See, e.g., United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 168
(2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 833 (2011) ("[T]he district court learned
that Juror # 8, using the electronic search engine 'Google,' had discovered that
co-defendant Tarik Shah had pleaded guilty to unspecified charges and then
communicated that fact to other jurors.").
45 See id.
46 See Ressler, supra note 12, at 213-14.
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plaintiffs. 4 7 The first came in 1961 with Poe v. Ullman, a case
challenging Connecticut's contraceptive prohibitions.4 8 The Supreme
Court did not discuss the propriety of the pseudonym but noted that the
plaintiffs used "fictitious names."4 9 Later, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme
Court made a similar comment.o More recently, the Supreme Court
recognized in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe that the
district court had permitted students and parents challenging student-led
prayer at public-school football games to litigate anonymously to protect
them from intimidation and harassment." Thus, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the threat of reprisals may justify privacy.
When assessing the strength of a plaintiff's privacy interest, courts
must also consider the public's interest in knowing the plaintiff's identity
and other relevant interests.5 2 A plaintiff's privacy interest grows
particularly strong in cases involving hotly contested social issues
because plaintiffs, by filing, may make "revelations about their personal
beliefs and practices that . . . [invite] . . . opprobrium analogous to the
infamy associated with criminal behavior."53 Courts recognize that
plaintiffs' privacy interests grow stronger when they may face unlawful
retaliation or risk injury.54
In other instances, courts have protected plaintiff privacy when so-
called matters of "utmost intimacy" will be discussed.5 Though the term
lacks a precise definition, it encompasses a wide variety of private
matters. Courts have protected the identities of rape survivors,
homosexual plaintiffs, transgender plaintiffs, plaintiffs with stigmatizing
diseases, and plaintiffs with mental illnesses on grounds of utmost
intimacy.56 Some courts also treat questions of faith and religion as a
matter of utmost intimacy, recognizing that a person's faith is a private
47 The Supreme Court's indulgence should not necessarily be read as an
endorsement. The Court may treat it as one of the issues "which merely lurk in
the record, neither brought to the attention of the Court nor ruled upon [and is
therefore] not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute
precedent . . . ." Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925).
48 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
49 Id. at 498 n.1.
50 410 U.S. 113, 120 n.4 (1973).
51 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
52 See M.M. v. Zavaras, 939 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Colo. 1996) ("The issue of
pseudonymity requires weighing the scales between the public's interest and the
rights to privacy advanced by the movant."), appeal dismissed, 98 F.3d 1349
(10th Cir. 1996).
13 Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981).
54 See Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The danger
of retaliation is often a compelling ground for allowing a party to litigate
anonymously."); Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
5sStegall, 653 F.2d at 185.
56 See Ressler, supra note 12, at 246 (collecting cases).
446 [Vol. 20:3
When Fear Rules in Law's Place
matter.5 7 Cases involving child plaintiffs have also received special
solicitude." In many of these cases, courts often consider how fears of
stigmatization may impact a plaintiff.5 9 These fears may be more salient
now because the Internet enables people to directly attack plaintiffs in
ways which would never have been possible a decade ago, such as by
posting their home addresses or other embarrassing information on
social media websites.60
Still, the boundary lines for protectable privacy interests remain
murky. Consider KJ5nne & Jaffe, a case where anonymous female
lawyers sought to litigate sexual harassment issues at Texas law firms. 6 1
The Fifth Circuit was not sympathetic to the plaintiffs' concerns for their
professional reputations and fears about being shut out of the job market.
It noted that the plaintiffs "face no greater threat of retaliation than the
typical plaintiff alleging Title VII violations, including the other women
who, under their real names and not anonymously, have filed sex
discrimination suits against large law firms."62 Finding no compelling
privacy interest to protect, nor any general authorization to proceed
anonymously, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's order
requiring the plaintiffs to reveal their names in the pleadings.6 3
Although case law provides some guidance, the scope of protectable
privacy interests remains disputed. For example, many courts will treat
mental illness as a matter of utmost intimacy and protect plaintiffs'
identities to shield them from the public revelation of their mental
illness.64 In contrast, other respected jurists caution against treating
mental illness as a matter of utmost intimacy because to do so "would be
to propagate the view that mental illness is shameful." 65 Thus, the
imprecise boundaries of what constitutes a private interest make the
overall balancing test less predictable as well.
1 Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186 ("[R]eligion is perhaps the quintessentially private
matter. Although they do not confess either illegal acts or purposes, the Does
have, by filing suit, made revelations about their personal beliefs and practices
that are shown to have invited an opprobrium analogous to the infamy
associated with criminal behavior.").
58 See Shertzer, supra note 13, at 2208.
59 Id. at 2209.
60 See Ressler, supra note 12, at 256.
61 S. Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d
707 (5th Cir. 1979).62 Id. at 713.
63 Id.
6 See, e.g., Doe v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 545, 550
(D.N.J. 2006) (recognizing a "substantial public interest in ensuring that cases
[involving] mental illness" are adjudicated "without the risk of stigmatization").
65 Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997).
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3. Fairness to the Defendant
Courts evaluate one final interest when deciding whether to allow
plaintiffs to proceed under a pseudonym: whether granting the plaintiff
anonymity would be fair to the defendant.66 Ressler divides this interest
into two parts: (i) "whether plaintiff pseudonymity will prejudice the
defendant's case by jeopardizing access to information necessary to the
defense" and (ii) "whether plaintiff pseudonymity is fair to the
defendant, who is 'required to defend himself publicly while the plaintiff
could make her accusations from behind a cloak of anonymity. "'67
The likelihood of prejudice to the defendant is higher in cases with
controverted factual records, where the plaintiff's personal credibility
plays a large role in establishing the weight of evidence. In these cases,
the defendant enjoys a strong interest in both knowing the plaintiff's
name and in publicizing the plaintiff's name to shake out any
information bearing on the plaintiff's credibility. In contrast, when the
matter is a question of law and the facts are undisputed, a defendant may
suffer little prejudice from a pseudonymous plaintiff.68
What then of cases where the defendants already know the plaintiffs'
names or where plaintiffs are willing to disclose their names, provided
the defendants keep such information from the public? In these
instances, the defendants' interest in fairness is diminished because
defendants may depose plaintiffs, request ordinary discovery, and
otherwise litigate the case normally. The Fourth Circuit endorsed this
approach in James v. Jacobson when it reversed a district court's
decision to deny the plaintiffs' request for pseudonymity. The court
found that the defendant would not be prejudiced because "the defendant
effectively could cross-examine the [plaintiffs] about any aspect of their
personal lives put in issue by their evidence" without suffering any
disadvantage.69 Thus, prejudice against the defendant may not always be
a material factor in the balancing test-particularly when defendant
already knows the plaintiff's identity.
66 The Fourth Circuit stressed this factor and corresponding interest in James v.
Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993).
67 Ressler, supra note 12, at 230 (quoting Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
68 See Doe v. Barrow County, 219 F.R.D. 189, 194 (N.D. Ga. 2003) ("This is not
a case that will be determined by plaintiffs credibility or recitation of facts.
Rather, as long as plaintiff has standing to sue, this case will depend on the
resolution of a legal question.").
69 6 F.3d at 242.
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B. MOVING FROM INTERESTS TO FACTORS
To help balance the three interests fairly, courts have recognized
various factors that should be considered in reaching a decision about
how the three interests balance in any particular case. In 2007, Ressler
distilled the dominant five factors as follows:
(1) whether the plaintiff would risk suffering injury
if publicly identified;
(2) whether the plaintiff is challenging governmental
activity;
(3) whether the plaintiff would be compelled to
admit her intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby
risking criminal prosecution;
(4) whether the plaintiff would be required to
disclose information of the utmost intimacy; and
(5) whether the party defending against a suit
brought under a pseudonym would be prejudiced.70
Though these five factors speak to the main interests (open courts,
plaintiff privacy interests, and fairness to the defendant), courts also
consider many other factors." Uncertainty remains about how many
factors a court should consider and how much weight courts should
assign to each factor. Considering the issue in 2008, the Second Circuit
articulated a list of ten non-exhaustive factors.72 Grappling with the same
issue, another court arrived at a list of nine different factors, six
weighing in favor of pseudonyms and three factors weighing against. 73
One commentator has described the trend as a "tendency to amass long,
70 Ressler, supra note 12, at 226 (collecting cases). Courts continue to recognize
additional factors such as whether the litigant's identity remains confidential or
whether the litigant is a minor. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
F.3d 185, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining "the caution that this list is non-
exhaustive and district courts should take into account other factors relevant to
the particular case under consideration").
71 See Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1046-47 (N.D. Iowa 1999)
(considering whether the plaintiff's identity has remained confidential or has
already been compromised).
72 Sealed Plaintif, 537 F.3d at 190.
7 See Doe v. Provident Life & Accident ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 467-68 (E.D.
Pa. 1997). The Provident Life standard was recently adopted by the Third
Circuit. Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 410 (3d Cir. 2011) ("As district courts
have been able to apply the Provident Life test and it does not conflict with the
tests that have been adopted by our sister circuits, we see no value in upsetting
its application. Accordingly, we endorse it.").
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non-exhaustive lists of factors . .. . In light of the growing number of
relevant factors, one court recently cautioned that any list must be
viewed as "non-exhaustive and district courts should take into account
other factors relevant to the particular case under consideration . . . .""
Thus, the factor analysis is helpful in balancing the interests of parties
and the public, but the non-exhaustive nature of the factors makes it
more difficult to predict which plaintiffs will qualify for pseudonymous
litigation.
III. THE RISK OF INJURY WITHIN THE FACTOR FRAMEWORK
The single most important factor for assessing the strength of
plaintiffs' privacy interests is whether they risk injury by filing the suit.
Ultimately, courts should make their decisions about the risks particular
plaintiffs face only after considering the reaction and retaliation that
have arisen out of similar cases.
At first blush, balancing plaintiffs' privacy interests against the
public interest in open judicial proceedings seems perfectly sensible. As
always, however, implementation controls the outcomes, and courts
making discretionary decisions may reach different conclusions.76
Indeed, Professor Donald P. Balla worried that courts weighing
pseudonym usage with "loose and undefined" factors may make
decisions that simply "boil down to the arbitrary leanings of individual
judges."7 7
An observer might wonder about arbitrariness when looking at how
courts draw different lines to define the risk of injury or retaliation.
Although all courts agree that risk of physical injury will justify
pseudonymous litigation," district courts differ on whether potential
psychological or economic injuries may be considered." The Southern
District of New York Court held that the "desire to avoid professional
74 Shertzer, supra note 13, at 2218.
1 Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 189-90.
76 As mentioned above, courts disagree about whether mental illness should be
treated as a matter of utmost intimacy. Compare Doe v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 545, 550 (D.N.J. 2006) (treating mental illness as
a matter of utmost intimacy), with Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 112
F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997) (cautioning against treating mental illness as
shameful).
n Balla, supra note 17, at 695.
7 See Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011); Sealed Plaintiff v.
Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2008); Does I thru XXIII v.
Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000); M.M. v. Zavaras,
139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 1998); James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir.
1993); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1981).
" See, e.g., Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186 ("[T]hreats of violence generated by this
case . . . tip the balance against the customary practice of judicial openness.").
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embarrassment and economic loss is insufficient to permit [plaintiffs] to
appear without disclosing [their] identity."80 But the Southern and
Eastern New York District courts explicitly found that "psychological
harm is a class of injury that could justify pseudonymous litigation." 8 '
Some courts formulate the risk of injury "factor more narrowly, as
[including only] a risk of physical retaliation . . . ."82 Others articulate the
factor more broadly as "whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory
physical or mental harm to the requesting party."83 Despite the varying
articulations, most courts adopt the better-reasoned standard and seek to
protect plaintiffs from both physical and mental injuries. 84 After all,
because all evidence indicates that the mind physically resides in the
brain, the line between physical and mental injury may be illusory."
Moving past the threshold issue of what forms of injury qualify, the
unguided discretion courts enjoy when evaluating how much risk
plaintiffs face for filing suit may be the more troubling matter. Courts are
not actuaries, and the case law provides little guidance about how a court
should quantify the risks plaintiffs face or what sorts of risks qualify. The
Ninth Circuit has, perhaps, the most developed guidance, which instructs
lower courts to consider the following: (i) "the severity of the threatened
harm," (ii) "the reasonableness of the anonymous party's fears," and (iii)
"the anonymous party's vulnerability to such retaliation."8 6 These
additional factors help frame the analysis, but they do not explicitly
instruct courts to consider retaliation that has occurred in similar cases.
80 Free Mkt. Comp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311, 313 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); see also John Doe v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 437, 439 n.1
(S.D.N.Y 1988) ("Courts should not permit parties to proceed pseudonymously
just to protect the parties' professional or economic life.").
8' Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Doe v. Smith, 105 F.
Supp. 2d 40, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding particularized allegations of threats to
mental health sufficient to justify pseudonymous proceedings).
82 Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. at 158 n.6.
83 Doe v. Pittsylvania County, 844 F. Supp. 2d 724, 732 (W.D. Va. 2012)
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).
84 See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993) (focusing on "whether
identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm"); Del Rio, 241
F.R.D. at 158 ("The risk of injury may be physical or psychological, greater or
less, more or less likely."); Doe v. Smith, 105 F. Supp. 2d 40, 42 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (considering "whether identification would put the plaintiff at risk of
suffering physical or mental injury"); cf Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th
Cir. 1981) (seemingly recognizing risk of mental injury from "serious social
ostracization based upon militant religious attitudes").
" See generally Antonio R. Damasio, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON,
AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994).
86 Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir.
2000) (citations omitted).
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The way courts define retaliation may shift the scale against
pseudonymity. Some courts define retaliation narrowly and decline to
consider any non-retaliatory harm that may flow from the stigma of
being identified as a plaintiff." Other courts simply expect plaintiffs to
endure "embarrassment and harassment" and find that embarrassment
and harassment "are generally insufficient to demonstrate retaliatory
harm."88
By using narrow definitions, courts may overlook the mental injury
and trauma plaintiffs experience from anticipating the same horrific
reprisals that other plaintiffs have suffered in similar cases. 89 In other
words, plaintiffs may fear a specific retaliation that goes beyond mere
harassment not because any such threat has been made, but because such
retaliation is a predictable occurrence in certain types of cases.
Consider, for example, the facts in Doe v. Pittsylvania County. In
that case, Barbara Hudson filed suit to challenge the county board's
undisputed practice of "regularly opening its meetings with Christian
prayer" and asked to proceed anonymously.9 o
Though Ms. Hudson may not have been aware of it at the time, in
many ways, her suit paralleled Wfynne v. Town of Great Falls because
both addressed local governments opening meetings with sectarian
prayer.91 The backlash in Wynne was horrifying. After the plaintiff
succeeded on the merits, someone broke into her home, decapitated her
pet African grey parrot and left a note reading "You're Next!" affixed to
the severed head.92 Her home was vandalized on nine separate
occasions.93 Her cat was hanged from a tree and gutted.94 She was
ostracized, and sand was poured into her truck's gas tank.95 A plaintiff
87 See Nelson v. Green, 3:06CV00070, 2007 WL 984127, at *2 (W.D. Va. Mar.
28, 2007) (finding that risk of retaliation did "not favor anonymity-although
identification of [plaintiff's] identity could conceivably pose a risk of future
mental harm, that harm would not be 'retaliatory' in nature").
88 Yacovelli v. Moeser, 1:02CV596, 2004 WL 1144183, at *7 (M.D.N.C. May
20, 2004) (finding that "[a]t most, the students here face social ostracism and
harassment which may upset them and disrupt their college community life").
89 See Michael J. Higdon, To Lynch A Child: Bullying and Gender
Nonconformity in Our Nation's Schools, 86 IND. L.J. 827, 847-60 (2011)
(discussing harms caused by bullying and fear).
90 Doe v. Pittsylvania County, 844 F. Supp. 2d 724, 727 (W.D. Va. 2012).
9' Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 294 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding
local practice of opening meetings with sectarian prayers unconstitutional); see
also Knauss, supra note 4.
92 Knauss, supra note 4.
9 Jack Kilpatrick, Wiccan's Case Reveals Town ' Intolerance, DESERET NEWS,
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filing a similar suit is likely to be tormented by the fear of similar
reprisals, and that fear may itself cause significant mental harm.
Although strikingly similar to ff nne,96 in Pittsylvania County, the
court declined to allow Ms. Hudson to proceed under a pseudonym
because she had not shown specifically that she was at risk of physical or
mental harm if her identity were revealed.97 Remarkably, even before her
identity was revealed, Ms. Hudson had received a troubling letter-
purportedly from the Ku Klux Klan-and put it before the court.98 That
letter reads:
Ms. Hudson
Thought you might be interested to know the
K.K.K. met on Monday Night. The meeting was not
about the black community, it was about who made the
complaint to the ACLU about prayer.
Your name was brought into the mix as a person of
interest. We have instructed our atty. to file every
F.O.I.A. available to verify the person that filed the
complaint.
Will keep you posted!
Grand Dragon99
For reasons unknown, the court did not read the letter as containing a
"veiled threat" that could "tip the scales in favor of anonymity" despite
the Ku Klux Klan's well-documented history of terroristic violence.' 00
The decision also found threatening calls to plaintiff's publicly identified
96 One could draw a superficial distinction arguing that as a Wiccan plaintiff,
Wynne faced unique stigma because of general witchcraft-related fears. This
tenuous distinction should not carry much weight because church-state plaintiffs
are routinely reviled as atheists. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Nonbelievers and
Government Speech, 97 Iowa L. Rev. 347, 357-63 (2012) (tracing history of
discrimination).
97 See Doe v. Pittsylvania County, 844 F. Supp. 2d 724, 732-34 (W.D. Va.
2012). The decision does not reveal whether the court was told about the
retaliation in Wynne.
98 Id. at 740.
99 Id.
1oo Id. at 740-44; see also David Chalmers, Essay: The Ku Klux Klan, S.
POVERTY L. CTR. (last visited Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/intelligence-files/ideology/ku-klux-klan/the-ku-klux-klan-0 ("The Ku
Klux Klan is a native-born American racist terrorist organization.").
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counsel irrelevant to the analysis because they did not indicate that the
plaintiff herself faced any risk of retaliatory harm.'0 '
What is troubling about the Pittsylvania County court's analysis is
not that it denied Ms. Hudson anonymity. Rather, it is that her request
may have been denied because the court focused too narrowly on the risk
of specific physical retaliation. The decision does reveal that the court
was presented with information about "a number of cases dating as far
back as 1945 in which Establishment Clause plaintiffs faced harassment,
retaliation, and physical violence."'0 2 Despite this knowledge, the court
found that "general fears of retaliation [did] not [show] the need for
pseudonymous litigation in this case.""o' Yet, the court never considered
whether Ms. Hudson's familiarity with the Establishment Clause cases
or cases like Wynne caused her to suffer mental injury from fear that she
would experience similar retaliation. Thus, while the court only found
general harassment aimed at Ms. Hudson, it should have considered that
this general harassment would likely result in specific harms, given the
history of retaliation against plaintiffs in cases like hers.
Although other judges, when presented with the facts in Pittsylvania
County, may have ruled differently, substantial precedent supported the
court's analysis. The Pittsylvania County court followed other decisions
that have rejected a "type of 'it has happened before, therefore it might
happen here' argument as being insufficient to justify a protective order
cloaking plaintiff in anonymity."' 04 These decisions decline to recognize
a risk of retaliation or injury to a particular plaintiff merely because harm
has befallen plaintiffs in other cases.o Without a full briefing on the
history of violence in particular kinds of cases showing that the violence
has continued to the present day, courts may remain unconvinced that
plaintiffs objectively and reasonably fear for their safety. For example,
one court denied a plaintiff's request to proceed under a pseudonym
1o' Pittsylvania County, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 734-39.
102 Id. at 733.
103 Id.
1' Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 172
F.R.D. 215, 217 (E.D. Tex. 1997)); accord Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bemice
Pauahi Bishop Estate, No. 08-00359JMS-BMK, 2008 WL 5423191, at *4 (D.
Haw. Dec. 31, 2008), aff'd sub nom. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Kamehameha
Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, CIV.08-00359JMS/BMK, 2009 WL 308351
(D. Haw. Feb. 6, 2009), aff'd sub nom. Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice
Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2010); Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228
F.R.D. 8, 12 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that vague, unsubstantiated fears of
retaliatory actions do not permit a plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym).
'os See Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 172 F.R.D. 215, 217 (E.D. Tex.
1997).
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when supported only by "three anecdotal accounts of religious
discrimination and harassment."' 06
This analysis raises a crucial question: when do isolated or anecdotal
accounts become a worrying trend? Courts may reasonably doubt
whether a particular plaintiff faces any real risk of retaliation because of
a few isolated instances of discrimination. This position surely becomes
less reasonable when many more than three anecdotal accounts
accumulate. At some point, the volume and severity of past reprisals
reaches a point where objectively reasonable people will simply decide
to "bite their tongues and go about their lives" instead of facing the
risk.'o7 At some point, a history of reprisals will induce enough fear to
chill litigation and cause stress-induced mental injuries in plaintiffs who
do decide to file. As discussed below, in the church-state context, we
passed that point long ago.
IV. A HISTORY OF REPRISAL IN CHURCH-STATE CASES
Church-state cases have long given rise to threats and violence. The
backlash is well documented. In the introduction to his 1996 book,
Without a Prayer: Religious Expression in Public Schools, Professor
Robert Alley recounts a conversation he had with a public school
principal about Bible lessons being taught during his son's classes.os
When Alley first broached the issue, the principal asked "What are you,
a Jew?" 09 After an anti-Semitic aside, the principal warned Alley not to
press his complaint further."0 The principal told Alley that he would stop
the religious instruction if Alley insisted, but that he would also make
sure that the other students knew which parent had insisted that the
"Bible stories" stop."' As Alley explained, this would position his child
to absorb any unpleasant backlash. Alley knew about reprisals following
other complaints and worried about what to do.112
Alley's experience led him to thoroughly document violence and
discrimination suffered by church-state plaintiffs. Writing at about the
"06 Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. # 5, No.
CIV.A.07-CV-02126-MS, 2009 WL 2176624, at *5 (D. Colo. July 22, 2009).
"I See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial
Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2083, 2171 (1996) ("Simply stated, the ostracism
that befalls plaintiffs who challenge cherished governmental endorsements of
religion is so extreme that most who are offended by these practices bite their
tongues and go about their lives.").
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same time, Professor Frank S. Ravitch showed that violence arising from
instances where the government engages in religious speech traces back
even further."3 Ravitch's book, School Prayer and Discrimination,
traces the trend back to at least the Philadelphia Bible Riots of 1844,
where fifty-eight people died and "one hundred and forty others were
wounded.""14 The riots were sparked by a school board resolution
allowing Catholic children to opt out of reading from the King James
Version of the Bible." 5
The violent trends have continued since Ravitch and Alley published
their books. Because Ravitch and Alley cover cases predating 1996 in
detail, I focus on instances occurring since that time. As shown below,
these are not sporadic or isolated events. Reprisals against church-state
plaintiffs must be viewed as additional incidents in a chain of violence
stretching back more than a century.
Nearly all of the cases detailed below involve instances where
schools or government engaged in religious speech by endorsing
particular faiths. When plaintiffs challenge whether a public institution
should be making such statements, the public seems to misconstrue the
suit as an assault on the statement itself or the closely and passionately
held views of religious adherents. For example, a case challenging
compulsory Bible reading in public schools may be wrongly interpreted
as an assertion that children should not be allowed to read the Bible.
To build the case for my argument that courts must not close their
eyes to violent trends, this section spends substantial time cataloging the
abuse that has followed after plaintiffs lodge their suits. I argue that these
incidents are not sporadic or unforeseeable. Plaintiffs do fear reprisals
for filing suit because so many plaintiffs have suffered for speaking up.
Courts must recognize the legitimacy of these fears and protect
plaintiffs' identities. If courts do not stand up for plaintiffs' rights, the
reprisals documented below will have served their purpose: they will
drive people out of the courts and allow fear to rule in law's place.
A. VIOLENT TIMELINE
1. Retaliation Against Vashti McCollum in 1945
In 1945, over a hundred years after the Philadelphia Bible Riots of
1844, Vashti McCollum challenged a voluntary program in her child's
public school, where students were allowed to select Protestant,
" RAVITCH, supra note 5, at 4 (describing harassment suffered by plaintiffs).
'1 4 Id. at 6.
1s Id.
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Catholic, or Jewish instruction."' She thought the case would be
resolved quickly. She was wrong. Later, McCollum described how she
misjudged the situation, explaining that she "took it for granted that
responsible people could follow their convictions without being thrown
into disgrace and out of a job."I17 She faced overwhelming backlash: her
house was vandalized, she received hate mail and threatening phone
calls, and her son was physically attacked."'
These incidents were not isolated occurrences. Ms. McCollum
received over six thousand pieces of mail after becoming the public face
of the suit." 9 Although she received many letters of encouragement, over
a thousand of the letters contained crudely scrawled threats such as: "I
hope you loose [sic] every cent you and your husband have, and are
tared [sic] and feathered and rode out of your community on a broom
stick."' 20 Others simply told her to "Go to hell!" or warned that "this
country is not for you you dirty lousy thrash [sic] out with you."' 2 '
If anonymous letters were not enough, the harassment also arrived in
more personal forms. Vandals defaced Ms. McCollum's car and house
with the letters "ATHIST [sic]."' 22 She was "fired from her job as a
dance instructor," pelted with rotten produce, and the "family cat was
lynched."'23
2. Arson and Violence in 1982
About forty years after Ms. McCollum's ordeal, in another well-
documented church-state case, the named plaintiffs, Joann Bell and
Lucille McCord, complained about sectarian weekly prayer sessions at
their children's public school.' 24 The two Oklahoma moms endured
vicious reprisals.'25 Someone burned Ms. Bell's house to the ground.126 A
116 See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (declaring that "the
First Amendment had erected a wall between Church and State which must be
kept high and impregnable").
1" MCCOLLUM, supra note 1, at 46.
118 See ALLEY, supra note 108, at 84-89.
"9 MCCOLLUM, supra note 1, at 97.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 98.
122 Id. at 8 1.
123 Douglas Martin, Vashti McCollum, 93, Who Brought Landmark Church-State
Suit, Is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 14792010.
124 See UPI, School Prayer Lawsuit Divides Oklahoma District, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1982, § 1, at 39, available at 1982 WLNR 332537 (stating that Ms.
Bell was a member of the Church of the Nazarene and Ms. McCord was a
member of the Church of Christ).
125 Id.
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school cafeteria worker assaulted Ms. Bell in a parking lot and "smashed
her head repeatedly against a car door."1 27 They were mailed their own
obituaries.128 MS. McCord's son's prize goats were "slashed and
mutilated with a knife," and an upside down cross was hung on his
locker.129 The Bells also received threatening phone calls. 13 0 One caller
said he "was going to break in the house, tie up the children, rape their
mother in front of them, and then 'bring her to Jesus."' 1 3 1 Eventually, the
harassment succeeded in running the plaintiffs out of town.13 2
Local officials were unsympathetic. They blamed the plaintiffs for
the harassment they endured. The school's superintendent, Paul
Pettigrew, commented that the "only people who have been hurt by this
thing are the Bells and McCords. The school goes on. They chose to
create their own hell on earth."1 33
3. Jessica Ahlquist Faces Abuse in 2010
The reprisals endured by the McCollums, Bells, McCords and others
are well documented and decades old. A court might be tempted to
disregard these instances because they happened in 1945 and in the
1980s.13 4 Recent experiences show, however, that vicious attacks and
harassment remain the norm.
In 2010, an "unnamed family with two children" in public school
complained about a prayer mural posted in the auditorium at Cranston
High School West ("Cranston West") in Cranston, Rhode Island.135 On
126 Sandhya Bathija, Hell in Little Axe: An Oklahoma Mom ' Chilling Battle





129 Id.; see also Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1397 (10th
Cir. 1985) ("Their children were called 'devil-worshipers' by other students and,
in one instance, an upside-down cross was hung on Robert McCord's locker.").
130 Strossen, supra note 10, at 612 ("Having received phone calls warning that
her house would be torched, Joann is convinced that" arsonists burned her house
down.).
131 ALLEY, supra note 108, at 107-08.
132 The Tenth Circuit's opinion recognized that "[t]he harassment persisted and
was severe enough to force plaintiffs and their families to move into the
adjoining school district." Bell, 766 F.2d at 1398.
1 Bathija, supra note 126.
134 Because other authors cover it in such extensive detail, I have not provided
much information about the many reprisals against church-state plaintiffs
between 1945 and the 1980s. For more information, see RAVITCH, supra note 5;
ALLEY, supra note 108.
13' Ahlquist v. City of Cranston, 840 F. Supp. 2d 507, 510-12 (D.R.I. 2012).
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behalf of this anonymous family, the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") requested that officials remove the prayer mural.136 After
learning about the controversy, Jessica Ahlquist, a student at Cranston
West, spoke out in favor of removing the prayer mural by starting an on-
line Facebook page and by appearing at public hearings.13
Ahlquist faced intense backlash from the start. Speaking at a school
committee meeting, she revealed that she was an atheist and that she
opposed the presence of the prayer mural.138 The crowd responded
angrily. Taking the floor after Ahlquist, one speaker declared "[i]f people
want to be Atheist, it's their choice and they can go to hell if they
want."'3 9 After this hearing, Ahlquist and a companion who also
supported removing the prayer mural "were escorted from the meeting
by the police because of concerns for their safety." 4 0 At another
meeting, a speaker declared that if the prayer mural were removed, the
school would be "spitting in the face of Almighty God."' 4 '
The harassment was not limited to harsh and impassioned criticism
at public meetings. Ahlquist "experienced bullying and threats at school,
on her way home from school and on-line."' 42 State officials publicly
vilified Ahlquist. Peter G Palumbo, Ahlquist's state representative,
called her "an evil little thing" on a talk radio show.143 During the
controversy, local flower shops declined to deliver to Jessica because of
"safety reasons."i 44
The anonymous local family that initially complained decided to
remain anonymous, and Ahlquist agreed to serve as the plaintiff for a
lawsuit.145 The court proceedings were straightforward and decided in
Ahlquist's favor.146 The threats, however, were graphic and continuous.
One tweet presented in the introduction of this Article reads: "your home
address posted online i [sic] cant wait to hear about you getting curb
136 Id.
"n Id. at 512-16.
138 Id.
13 Id. (quoting speaker at public meeting).
140 Id. At subsequent meetings, speakers called for her to be charged with a hate
crime for opposing the prayer mural. Id.
141 Id. at 514.
142 Id. at 516.
143 Abby Goodnough, Student Faces Town s Wrath in Protest Against a Prayer,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, at A12.
' Id.
145 Id.
146 See Ahlquist, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 524-25 (describing a controlling Supreme
Court case as "directly on all fours" with the dispute).
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stomped you fucking worthless cunt."l47 At one point, Ahlquist required
a police escort to and from school. 148 And because her address was
posted online, Ahlquist was forced to consider transferring schools. 14 9
The harassment continued even after the lawsuit ended. This piece of
handwritten hate mail arrived four months after the court decision:
The cops will not watch you forever.
We will get you good.
Tell your little asshole sister to watch her back.
There are many of us, "Crusaders," we have a better
pool going to see who gets you first!
Your fuckin old man better move or keep you locked
up if you know whats good for you.
We know where he works, what kind of cars you
have + the plate numbers of the cars.
Get the fuck out of R.I. you bitch whore. You are
nothing more than a sex-toy of a slut. Maybe you will
gang-banged before we throw you out of one of our
cars.
WE WILL GET YOU- LOOK OUT!150
Perhaps because of the police escorts, Ahlquist has not reported
suffering any actual physical violence. Still, her experience warns others
about what to expect if they become the face of a church-state suit.
147 Ophelia Benson, Who ' Oppressing Whom, COUNCIL FOR SECULAR
HUMANISM, http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=fi&page= ben
son 32_4 (last visited Aug. 30, 2012).
148 Elisabeth Harrison, RI. Student Draws Ire Over School Prayer Challenge,
NPR (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/146538958/rhode-island-
district-weighs-students-prayer-lawsuit.
149 Mathew Cortina, RI Teen Who Brought Down Prayer Banner Unwittingly
Caught in the Crosshairs?, CHRISTIAN POST (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.
christianpost.com/news/ri-teen-who-brought-down-prayer-banner-unwittingly-
caught-in-the-crosshairs-67390/#Kj RpmZ2zd8mtqzEs.99.
I Hemant Mehta, Jessica Ahlquist Gets Nasty Hatemail, FRIENDLY ATHEIST
(Apr. I, 2012), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist/2012/04/1 /
jessica-ahlquist-gets-nasty-hatemail/.
460 [Vol. 20:3
When Fear Rules in Law's Place
4. Damon Fowler Disowned in 2011
Complaints about church-state entanglement do not need to reach the
courthouse to trigger backlash. In 2011, Damon Fowler, a senior at a
public high school in Louisiana, discovered that his graduation ceremony
would include a Christian prayer."' Knowing that public schools cannot
constitutionally subject students to graduation prayers,152 Fowler
contacted the school officials to point out that the planned prayer was
unconstitutional and notified them that he would contact the ACLU if the
prayer occurred.153 The school initially agreed to cancel the prayer, but
Fowler's name was leaked as the source of the complaint.' 54
Fowler never actually filed suit. As with the other instances, people
threatened to kill him and other students boasted that they were going to
"jump him."55 Illustrating the real dangers of ostracism that many
plaintiffs fear, Fowler's own parents disowned him, refused all financial
support, turned him out of the house, and tossed his belongings out onto
the porch of the family home.156 After he complained, one of Fowler's
teachers demeaned him in a local publication as "a student who really
hasn't contributed anything to graduation or to [his] classmates . . . .""5
Fowler did not even succeed at stopping the prayer. In a rancorous move,
the school included a student-led invocation before a moment of silence
despite earlier assurances that the graduation ceremony would not
include prayers."'
151 American Humanist Association, Humanists Launch "Naughty" Awareness
Campaign, STATES NEWS SERVICE (Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.american
humanist.org/news/details/20 11-11-american-humanist-association-naughty-
atheist-awaren.
152 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992) (stating that "the
controlling precedents as they relate to prayer and religious exercise in primary
and secondary public schools compel the holding" that school sponsored
graduation prayer is unconstitutional).
'5 Greta Christina, High School Student Stands Up Against Prayer at Public
School and Is Ostracized, Demeaned and Threatened, ALTERNET (May 25,
2011),
http://www.alternet.org/story/151086/high-school student-stands-up-against p
rayer-at-public-school and is ostracized,_demeanedandthreatened.154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
15 Mark Rainwater, Student Challenges Prayer at Bastrop Graduation:
Threatens to Contact ACLU If Prayer Is Offered, BASTROP DAILY
ENTERPRISE, May 18, 2011, http://www.bastropenterprise.com/features
/x2132687894/Student-challenges-prayer-at-Bastrop-graduation.
158 Mark Rainwater, Just Like Any Other Graduation, BASTROP DAILY
ENTERPRISE, May 20, 2011, http://www.bastropenterprise.com/news/
xl 796494554/Just-like-any-other-graduation.
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5. Federal Marshalls Guard Judge in 2011
In the recent case of Schultz v. Medina Valley Independent School
District, threats and intimidation again followed a church-state challenge
when a San Antonio family disputed a local practice of offering student-
led prayers at public school graduations.' As with the other cases, the
plaintiffs faced public calls for violence against them. One person wrote,
"This Agnostic shthead [sic] needs to thank God that he graduated ...
in one piece!" 6 o Another declared, "In my day he would have been
crying out to God while being stomped by bullies . . . ."161
Despite the outcry, the case continued. The plaintiffs secured a
preliminary injunction prohibiting prayers at graduation, which the Fifth
Circuit quickly dissolved in a per curiam decision.'6 2 The public reacted
strongly to the initial ruling and to the Fifth Circuit's intervention. Public
focus pivoted toward the district court judge who issued the ruling,
showing that church-state cases may also subject courts to unusual
pressures. 163 In this case, the district court judge was inundated with
letters and calls, one saying that he should "die from cancer or drink
human waste."l 64 Others threatened to "kick his ass."'6 1 To protect the
judge, U.S. Marshals began "a nearly round-the-clock security detail." 66
Still, the backlash had other effects. At the time, an additional
student had sought to join the case under a pseudonym. In view of the
risks, the anonymous plaintiff opted to withdraw rather than reveal his
name.'16 Unlike federal judges, prospective plaintiffs do not enjoy the
1' See Guillermo Contreras, No Prayer at School Graduation, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, June 1, 2011, at I B, available at 2011 WLNR 10939041.
160 Comment to Prayer Outlawed From Local High School Graduation




162 Order at 1, Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 11-50486-
00511498424 (5th Cir. June 3, 2012) (per curiam), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/57111291/Schultz-v-Medina-School-Dist-6-3-11.
The Fifth Circuit was not convinced that plaintiffs were substantially likely to
prevail on the merits in showing that "individual prayers or other remarks to be
given by students at graduation [would be], in fact, school sponsored." Id.
163 Id.
'" Guillermo Contreras, Colorful Judge Biery at Eye of Legal Storm, SAN




167 Guillermo Contreras, Student Bails out of Prayer Case, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS- NEWS, Dec. 7, 2011, at 2B, available at 2011 WLNR 25326432.
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comforts of life tenure, guaranteed salary, or the vigilant protection of
the United States Marshal Service.'6 8
The district court eventually approved a settlement in the case, and
the judge concluded his order with the following unusual personal
statement:
To the United States Marshal Service and local
police who have provided heightened security: Thank
you.
To those Christians who have venomously and
vomitously cursed the Court family and threatened
bodily harm and assassination: In His name, I forgive
you.
To those who have prayed for my death: Your
prayers will someday be answered, as inevitability
trumps probability.
To those in the executive and legislative branches of
government who have demagogued this case for their
own political goals: You should be ashamed of
yourselves.
To the lawyers who have advocated professionally
and respectfully for their clients' respective positions:
Bless you.169
B. CHURCH-STATE CASESARE VOLATILE
The foregoing cases make the point unmistakably clear: church-state
cases are dangerous. They are not outliers. Although the point could be
proved by simply continuing to enumerate a litany of examples, it may
be more analytically useful to categorize cases by the type of retaliation
plaintiffs have faced and the fears that haunt prospective plaintiffs.
1. Arson
Plaintiffs in church-states cases should recognize that they may
become targets for arson. In 1963, the Supreme Court decided Abington
School District v. Schempp and found for the first time that public
schools could not constitutionally compel Bible reading.7 o For their
168 U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1.
169 Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-1 I-CA-422-FB, slip op.
at 3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/tx/
Schultz vMedinaValley.pdf.
170 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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trouble, one of the plaintiff's children was beaten on the way home from
school and the family's home was firebombed.' 7 1
The Schempp family has not been the only one to face arsonists. As
mentioned above, Joann Bell's home was also burned to the ground after
anonymous callers threatened to torch it.'72 When the local volunteer fire
department arrived, their truck tanks, curiously, contained no water and
they did not fight the fire. 71
2. Death Threats
Once a church-state suit receives publicity, death threats are likely to
follow. In one famous case from 1995, Lisa Herdahl filed suit to
challenge the "broadcast [of] morning devotionals and sectarian prayers
over [the public] school intercom system."l 74 Afterward, unnamed
persons focused on her family and threatened to bomb her home.'7 5 The
family's children were ostracized and called "atheists" and "devil
worshipers" by their classmates.'7 ' Before being driven from her
employment, the convenience store she managed received a bomb
threat.177
Although obvious, it bears noting that death threats are frequently
used to induce fear and to intimidate, rather than to convey an actual
intent to kill. However, potential plaintiffs may reasonably fear for their
lives. In other contexts such as with abortion doctors, zealots have
followed through on their threats to kill people. 7 1 When persons are
killed, death threats grow even more terrifying. Consider one of the
death threats arising out of Kitzmiller v. Dover. In that case, Tammy
Kitzmiller challenged a public school district's policy of teaching
1' See ALLEY, supra note 108, at 98.
172 Strossen, supra note 10, at 612-13.
'73 Id. at 613.
174 Herdahl v. Pontotoc Cnty. Sch. Dist., 887 F. Supp. 902, 904 (N.D. Miss.
1995).
17 Gary Borg, Judge Strikes Down School's Prayers, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 1996,
available at 1996 WLNR 5186889.
176 Strossen, supra note 10 at 614 (citing Stephanie Saul, A Lonely Battle in
Bible Belt: A Mother Fights to Halt Prayer at Miss. School, NEWSDAY, Mar. 13,
1995, at A8).
17 Id.
178 See, e.g., Joe Stumpe & Monica Davey, Abortion Doctor Shot to Death in
Kansas Church, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
06/01/us/Oltiller.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0 ("George Tiller, one of only a few
doctors in the nation who performed abortions late in pregnancy, was shot to
death here Sunday in the foyer of his longtime church as he handed out the
church bulletin.").
464 [Vol. 20:3
When Fear Rules in Law ' Place
"intelligent design" (i.e., creationism instead of evolution.)' 79 One of the
death threats she received reads, in part, "I will be watching in the years
to come how God punishes you or your daughters. Madelyn [sic] Murray
(a famous atheist) was found murdered for taking prayer and bible [sic]
reading out of the schools, so watch out for a bullet."'" The chilling
threat refers to the death of Madalyn Murray O'Hair, the former
president of American Atheists, whose dismembered corpse was found
alongside the dismembered corpses of her son and granddaughter in
2001."' Even the judge who decided the Kitzmiller case "accepted the
protection of federal marshals after [his family also] received death
threats" because of his decision. 18 2
3. Physical Assaults
Retaliation sometimes takes the form of direct physical assault. In
one relatively recent case, Joseph Tyler Deveney, an eighteen-year-old
plaintiff, successfully challenged school-sponsored prayer at his
graduation ceremony." For his trouble, he was attacked by a group of
eight teenagers.' 84 Making the rationale for the attack unmistakably
clear, one of the assailants "looked at Deveny [sic] and said, 'Oh, you
hate God?' before hitting him in the face.'
Deveney has not been the only plaintiff to face physical assaults. As
mentioned above, Joann Bell was also briefly hospitalized after a school
employee bashed her head into a car door and ripped out chunks of her
hair while threatening to kill her.'86 Because of the risk of physical
'7 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 764 (M.D. Pa.
2005) ("To briefly reiterate, we first note that since [intelligent design] is not
science, the conclusion is inescapable that the only real effect of the [intelligent
design] Policy is the advancement of religion.").
I Ed Brayton, Plaintiff Intimidation in Church/State Cases, Sci. BLOGS (Jan.
17, 2007), http://scienceblogs.com/dispatches/2007/01/17/plaintiff-intimidation-
in-chur/.
181 Ross E. Milloy, Bodies Identified as Those of Missing Atheist and Kin, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2001, at Al0, available at 2001 WLNR 3338091 (describing
the discovery of the corpses). Although we do not know who killed O'Hair,
many believe that she was murdered in what appeared to be an extortion scheme
by a former employee of American Atheists whom she had previously fired. Id.
182 Clay Evans, Misjudging Our Judges, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA (CO), June
18, 2006, at EO 1, available at 2006 WLNR 12107700.
183 See Deveney v. Bd. of Educ. of Cnty. of Kanawha, 231 F. Supp. 2d 483, 484,
488 (S.D. W. Va. 2002).
184 See Charles Schumaker, Police Briefs: Student Beaten for Prayer Suit, He
Says, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, June 19, 2002, available at 2002
WLNR 1037691.
185 Id.
186 See Strossen, supra note 10, at 612.
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assault, named plaintiffs in a controversial case may find that they have
to adjust their habits and routines so as not to ever be caught alone.
4. Proxy Violence
Sometimes, plaintiffs may find their pets and other animals
slaughtered as a means to intimidate them. Melinda Maddox filed a suit
challenging a decision to install "a two-and-one-half ton monument to
the Ten Commandments as the centerpiece of the rotunda in the Alabama
State Judicial Building" for the express purpose of reminding everyone
of "the sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God over both the state and
the church."' 87 She faced particularly nasty backlash. Someone shot all
of the windows out of her house.' Unknown persons shot all the
squirrels in her yard and hung the corpses from her trees as gruesome
warnings.'"
In addition to the proxy violence, callers threatened to kill her,
unknown persons threatened her parents, and her vehicle was
vandalized.'90 One caller referred "to a brutal murder that had been in the
news at the time, t[elling] her, 'You should be hogtied and thrown in the
Escambia River, like that girl was last year."" 9' When she complained,
local officials suggested that she drop her case.' 9 2
Although this breakdown separates death threats from proxy
violence, proxy violence may be best viewed as a form of death threat.
By hanging dead squirrels in Melinda Maddox's yard, the perpetrators
clearly intended to place her in fear for her life. Indeed, the note affixed
to the severed head of Darla Wynne's pet parrot explicitly used proxy
violence to make a death threat when it said, "You're Next!"'
5. Extreme Ostracism
Church-state plaintiffs should also expect to endure more than
ordinary criticism. They are likely to face "serious social ostracization
[sic] based upon militant religious attitudes."' 94 Indeed, publicly named
church-state plaintiffs routinely report extreme social ostracism. Lisa
'8 Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003).




190 Rob Boston, Plucky Lindy, CHURCH & STATE (Apr. 1, 2004), https://
www.au.org/church-state/april-2004-church-state/featured/plucky-lindy. One of
the death threats was particularly chilling.
'' Id.
192 Id.
193 Knauss, supra note 4.
194 Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Herdahl's story provides one example. After she filed suit, nearly "every
house and business posted a sign opposing" her lawsuit.195
The Herdahl family has not been the only one to face ostracism. In
Dobrich v. Walls, the Dobrich family sued to stop public school teachers
from proselytizing, distributing Bibles, and giving special privileges to
students for attending Christian clubs.' 96 After the case attracted
attention, anti-Semitic threats drove the Jewish family out of town.'9 7
These are not isolated instances. Other plaintiffs have also been
ostracized in extreme ways. In 2001, troubled by religious holiday
displays on town property, Anonka Jocham brought suit seeking to end
the practice. 98 From the outset, the court explained that Ms. Jocham's
"request was not well-received, . . . several (but not all) [of the county]
Commissioners reacted angrily" to her request, and other attendees
"directed derisive comments toward the plaintiffs."' 99 Afterward, at a
religious rally held at the local courthouse, Ms. Jocham and her co-
plaintiffs were denounced, and rally participants spat on a reporter who
had covered the initial public meeting. 200
These cases showcase some of the risks plaintiffs face. Having
appraised the risks, I next argue that courts should reexamine existing
standards to ensure adequate protection of plaintiffs' safety and privacy
interests.
V. COURTS SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT PAST REPRISALS CREATE
PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM
The recent cases documented above show that the terrifying trend of
reprisals against church-state plaintiffs continues. These reprisals send a
clear message to potential plaintiffs: if you file a church-state case, you
are choosing "to create [your] own hell on earth."20 ' The backlash
against efforts to maintain separation of church and state has continued
unabated since the Philadelphia Bible Riots of 1844. Moreover, frequent
demagogy continually inflames passion around separation-of-church-
195 Strossen, supra note 10, at 614.
196 Dobrich v. Walls, 380 F. Supp. 2d 366, 371 (D. Del. 2005) ("Plaintiffs allege
that prayers have been recited at graduation ceremonies, athletic events, potluck
dinners, ice cream socials, awards ceremonies, and other events.").
19 Id.; see also Neela Banerjee, Families Challenging Religious Influence in
Delaware Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at Al0, available at 2006 WLNR
13104007 ("[H]er son was ridiculed in school for wearing his yarmulke. She
described a classmate of his drawing a picture of a pathway to heaven for
everyone except 'Alex the Jew."').
1' See Jocham v. Tuscola County, 239 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
199 Id. at 720.
200 Id. at 721.
201 Bathija, supra note 126.
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and-state issues and makes it difficult for plaintiffs to seek judicial
remedies.
The backlash in church-state cases illustrates a systemic risk to our
democracy. Even though potential plaintiffs often have strong,
constitutional arguments,202 the Constitution's words mean little when
individuals fear to file. Although it remains difficult to survey
individuals who are too afraid to step forward, it seems obvious that
people may decide not to complain because they do not want to receive
death threats.203
We can, however, observe intimidation's effects in past cases by
looking at the individuals that form a circle of support around cases with
named plaintiffs. For example, along with hate mail, Ms. McCollum also
received letters of support thanking her for doing what the authors feared
to do themselves. One wrote, "'Good luck and thanks for being the
whipping boy for those others (me) who think as you do but do not do as
you have done . . . ."'204 In recent times, people have been willing to
complain anonymously yet stop short of filing because they do not "want
to be made out to be a villain." 2 05 Similarly, in Ms. Ahlquist's case, an
anonymous parent initially complained to the ACLU, which then wrote a
letter of complaint. That parent remained anonymous when Ms. Ahlquist
agreed to serve as the public plaintiff.2 06 For every named plaintiff, many
more probably considered filing a suit and opted against it because they
did not want to face the backlash.20 7 In this sort of environment,
202 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) ("No holding by this Court
suggests that a school can persuade or compel a student to participate in a
religious exercise. That is being done here, and it is forbidden by the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."); accord County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) ("[N]ot even the 'unique history' of
legislative prayer can justify contemporary legislative prayers that have the
effect of affiliating the government with any one specific faith or belief.").
203 See Epstein, supra note 107, at 2171 ("Simply stated, the ostracism that
befalls plaintiffs who challenge cherished governmental endorsements of
religion is so extreme that most who are offended by these practices bite their
tongues and go about their lives.").
204 MCCOLLUM, supra note 1, at 188.
205 Vassar Other Towns Should Consider Nativity Scene Policy, SAGINAW
NEWS, Dec. 18, 2009, at A6, available at 2009 WLNR 25474837 (explaining
why local resident requested that the ACLU keep his identity secret to publicly
complain about a nativity scene).
206 See Goodnough, supra note 143.
207 For yet another example, consider how intimidation and fear also influenced
the Medina Valley case. A pseudonymous student plaintiff withdrew from the
case when it became clear that his identity might be exposed to an angry public.
See Contreras, supra note 167.
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constitutional protections may mean little when people fear to speak
up. 208
Without privacy protection, bad actors may win through intimidation
what they could never secure in court. The chilling effect is real. Faced
with the same choice presented to the plaintiffs described above, many
people suffer injustice silently.20 9 We can hardly blame them. Given the
past reprisals, keeping silent about church-state issues may be a wise
choice. Tragically, as this Article explains, constitutional protections do
not help if people fear to demand that the laws be followed.210
Still, a central question remains: how should courts address the
problem in church-state cases and in other areas where plaintiffs face
similar risks? An analytic framework for pseudonymous litigation
already exists. Moreover, many plaintiffs have successfully brought
cases under pseudonyms after convincing courts that they face a risk of
retaliatory harm. The most straightforward way to address the problem is
to broaden the analysis slightly to account for the retaliation experienced
by past plaintiffs.
As the analysis is applied now, courts miss significant mental
injuries plaintiffs will suffer for filing. This approach must change.
Though most courts recognize that plaintiffs should be permitted to
litigate under a pseudonym if open proceedings present a specific risk of
physical or mental injury, courts have never explicitly recognized
possible damage from fears created by past systemic retaliation as a risk
that fits within these categories.21 '
When plaintiffs file church-state actions, they expose themselves to
possible retaliation and intimidation from those who hold opposing
interpretations of (or simply do not care about) the Constitution's limits
208 As one author explains "people are often too intimidated to insist on their
legal rights . . . because they're afraid they'll be bullied, ostracized, and
threatened with violence by their classmates, their co-workers, their
communities, their friends, even their families . . . . And I'm angry because
these people aren't wrong to be afraid." GRETA CHRISTINA, WHY ARE YOU
ATHEISTS So ANGRY? 99 THINGS THAT PISS OFF THE GODLESS ch. 1, list no. 33
(Kindle ed. 2012).
209 Epstein, supra note 107.
20 toid.
211 See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating "whether
identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm"); Doe v. Del
Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("The risk of injury may be physical
or psychological, greater or less, more or less likely."); Doe v. Smith, 105 F.
Supp. 2d 40, 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (considering "whether identification would put
the plaintiff at risk of suffering physical or mental injury"); cf Doe v. Stegall,
653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing risk of mental injury from
"serious social ostracization [sic] based upon militant religious attitudes").
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on governmental endorsements of religion. While plaintiffs may not
always experience the harsh retaliation chronicled above, they will
undoubtedly be tormented by the fear of suffering reprisals similar to
those experienced by plaintiffs in prior cases. They will fear arson, death
threats, physical assault, proxy violence, and extreme social ostracism. 212
The reprisals from past cases live on through the fear they continue to
generate. As Faulkner famously wrote, "The past is never dead. It's not
even past."213
Courts have repeatedly recognized in a variety of non-anonymous
contexts that living in fear of violence causes significant mental
harms.2 14 Courts should extend those holdings to cases in which
plaintiffs seek anonymity. Scholars have discussed how "people who are
forced to live under the shadow of such threats suffer a myriad of
psychological and health problems including nightmares, heart
problems, inability to work, loss of appetite, and insomnia."2 15
Compounding the fear generated by past reprisals, plaintiffs also fear
that they will be blamed for stirring up controversy and bringing the
attacks on themselves.2 16
Counsel in these cases should put the plaintiff's fears squarely
before the court when requesting permission to proceed
pseudonymously. An affidavit from a medical professional describing the
likely effects of the fear may suffice to explain the impact past reprisals
have on future plaintiffs. Courts should not require plaintiffs to possess
superhuman resilience and should be satisfied by an objective medical
analysis showing that publicly facing the perils of a church-state case (or
212 See supra Section II.
213 WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FORANUN 73 (Vintage Int'l 2011) (1950).
214 Heisler v. Kralik, 981 F. Supp. 830, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd sub nom.
Heisler v. Rockland County, 164 F.3d 618 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating inmates may
seek "damages in the absence of any physical attack if the inmate has suffered
'extreme and officially sanctioned psychological harm' from living in fear of
attack" (citation omitted)); Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1127 (D.
Or. 2000) (awarding damages to lesbian couple for psychological harm caused
by hate mail); Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F. Supp. 664, 673-74 (N.D. Tex. 1998)
(discussing psychological harm caused by threats from anti-abortion
harassment).
215 Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 283, 291 (2001) (citing Arne Ohman, Fear and Anxiety as
Emotional Phenomena, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 512-14 (Michael Lewis &
Jeanette M. Haviland eds., 1993)).
216 When individuals fear that they will be blamed and stigmatized for the
wrongs others commit against them, they are less likely to come forward with
complaints. See Julie Goldscheid, Reconsidering Domestic Violence Services
and Advocacy, 29 PACE L. REv. 227, 239 (2009) ("[P]ersistent, victim-blaming
attitudes that deter women from seeking help and that limit the redress available
for those who do seek assistance.").
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other cases provoking extreme passions) will subject plaintiffs to
psychological trauma.
Critics of this approach may object that the harms presented do not
always flow from actual retaliation directed at a particular plaintiff. This
misses the point. Past aggressors acted not only to intimidate their
contemporary plaintiffs, but future plaintiffs as well. Current plaintiffs
deserve recognition as secondary victims of campaigns of intimidation.
Their suits stand as individual actions within a chain of precedent.
Indeed, some death threats, such as the one received by Tammy
Kitzmiller that referenced the gruesome murder of Madalyn Murray
O'Hair, even incorporate references to past atrocities. The fear created
by past reprisals lives on.
Courts must recognize that even when filing under a pseudonym,
plaintiffs act with extraordinary courage. If their identities are exposed,
they may be shunned, fired from their jobs, or otherwise cut off from
society. Distressingly, they are right to fear exposure even when granted
the protection of a pseudonym. The Supreme Court has commented on
the problem. Justice Stevens noted in Santa Fe that the school district
'apparently neither agreed with nor particularly respected"' the district
court's decision to protect the plaintiffs' identities.2 17 By requiring every
plaintiff to step forward with a steel skin, the courts may tacitly concede
constitutional oversight to the aggressors, essentially allowing fear to
usurp the rule of law. While courts do not choose which cases they hear,
in this situation, they must make meaningful decisions about which
plaintiffs to protect with pseudonyms. By setting an unreasonably high
bar for what constitutes a protectable fear, courts force plaintiffs to face
their aggressors unarmed and turn their backs on cases they would
otherwise be hearing. As one noted jurist declared in another context,
"the federal courts must be safe havens for those who seek to vindicate
their rights. No litigant should fear for his safety, or that of his family, as
a condition of seeking justice." 2 18
The solution to systematic intimidation is to recognize how the
system functions and to evaluate the cases within this context.
Potentially unconstitutional practices continually recur because
objections to these practices are not worth the trouble. Courts should
therefore be presented with the full history of reprisals so that they can
217 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 n.1 (2000) (quoting Doe
v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 809 n.1 (5th Cir. 1999)).
218 Doe v. Kamehameha Sch., 625 F.3d 1182, 1182 (9th Cir. 2010).
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consider how past intimidation threatens current plaintiffs. In church-
state cases, the history of violence is clear and unmistakable. 2 19
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the overarching policy question is whether courts should
allow intimidation to usurp the rule of law? If courts decline to protect
plaintiffs' identities, the courts themselves may lose their power to
ensure that the Constitution's requirements are observed. After all, courts
cannot hear cases that plaintiffs do not file. The dangers discussed above
are simply too well and too long known for courts to ignore. Twenty
years ago, Justice Blackmun discussed the dangers flowing from
admixtures of government and religion. He recognized that religion
remains uniquely divisive and noted that across the spectrum of litigated
issues, opponents of school prayer are some of the only plaintiffs that
actually receive death threats.220 Indeed, the cases profiled above show
that violence and death threats have not abated in recent years.
Despite (or perhaps because of) the dangers, courts must assert their
primacy to ensure that fear does not continue to displace the rule of law.
Whenever a climate of fear exists because of past intimidation, courts are
uniquely positioned to remedy this problem. By accounting for systemic
intimidation when considering plaintiffs' requests to litigate
anonymously, judges can ensure that intimidation does not block access
to the courts. The use of pseudonyms may not solve all problems
flowing from intimidation, but courts should not ask individual plaintiffs
to bear these risks when such a simple solution is possible.
219 Although beyond the scope of this Article, the same systemic risk may
appear in other types of cases such as those involving abortion rights, queer
plaintiffs and others. For example, in Roe v. Operation Rescue, the court
allowed the plaintiffs to use a pseudonym because of the documented history of
violence from anti-abortion activists. 123 F.R.D. 500, 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(remarking that "the conduct of certain anti-abortion protesters leaves little
doubt in the court's mind that requiring [plaintiffs] to go beyond giving verified
statements by attending hearings and depositions may subject them to undue
harassment").
220 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 607 n.10 (1992) (quoting Michele A. Parish,
Graduation Prayer Violates the Bill ofRights, UTAH B.J., June/July 1991, at 19.
472 [Vol. 20:3
